The $3 trillion of new money in the Clinton era funded a Dot-Com boom bubble that burst around 2000, when Bush II became USA President. As with all booms, some Dot-Com assets survived, so maybe about $1 trillion remained in the Dot-Com sector with $2 trillion collapse-money seeking to flow to some other sector.
In the first term (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) of Bush II included the 9/11 destruction of the Twin Towers and the beginning of the Iraq War, but the dominant economic force was the flow of money from collapsed Dot-Com assets into a Mortgage Bubble based on housing construction funded by banks who created complex securites based on mortgages and sold them to Hedge-Fundies.
The securitization process insulated the banks from risk, so the banks could and did lend to everybody who asked for money, without regard to credit-worthiness.
The securitization process was so complex that the Hedge-Fundies could and did easily hide the probability of risk from their investors.
As long as the Mortgage Bubble continued to grow faster than problems arose, the builders, bankers, and Hedge-Fundies, and their insurers, were very happy sharing the Bubble Money:
q $2 trillion created under Clinton, flowing into the Mortgage Bubble from the Dot-Com collapse q plus $2 trillion created under the first term of Bush II, by which the Money Supply went from $7 trillion to $9 trillion.
During the first half (2004) (2005) (2006) Some of it went to the Iraq War, but my guess is that no more than $1 trillion.
Another $2 trillion can be accounted for by adding another$2 trillion to the Clinton $2 trillion and the Bush II first-term $2 trillion puts the Mortgage Bubble size at the $6 trillion figure mentioned by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard as the amount of mortgages covered by USA agencies.
The remaining $1 trillion may have gone to parts of the Mortgage Bubble not covered by those USA agencies, so that:
the collapsing Mortgage Bubble accounts for $7 trillion, about half of the total Money Supply of $14 trillion.
Of course, all the Mortgages are not bad, so some of the $8 trillion Mortgage Bubble is sound, so maybe a useful guess might be that the bad part might be about $3 trillion. If so, such a
Mortgage Bubble Collapse would contract the Money Supply to $11 trillion.
Is there another Bubble where the lost $3 trillion could go ?
Could such a New Bubble actually produce something long-term useful, and not lead to yet another collapse ?
USA Government projects producing more economic growth than they cost include:
q the Interstate Highway System q Jet Aircraft q Electronic Computers q Internet q Nuclear Energy
One of those, Nuclear Energy, is not only useful in the short term due to the eminent Depletion of Cheap Oil, but is also useful in the long term. Using Nuclear Reactors to produce energy and hydrogen fuel and to desalt sea water would solve a lot of problems of the world.
Manufacturing and maintaining the reactors could re-establish the USA as a manufacturing power.
To avoid the risk of short-term capitalist greed outsourcing the jobs and factories related to Nuclear Energy, the project should be, like the Interstate Highway System, a USA Government project:
The USA Government should create a Nuclear Energy Project and fund it with the $3 trillion that would otherwise be lost in a Mortgage Bubble Collapse. Now (March 2008 ) the world has $14 trillion USA, of wihich about $7 trillion are related to mortgages, but:
leverage multiplies the amount of assets in the world, so: Entities who wrote the insurance -and would have been required to pay out if the companies defaulted -are the big winners. They can breathe a sigh of relief, pocket the premiums they earned on the insurance and live to play another day.
Investors who bought credit insurance to hedge their Bear Stearns ... bonds will be happy to receive new debt obligations from the acquirers in exchange for their stakes. They are simply out the premiums they paid to buy the insurance.
On the other hand, the big losers here are those who bought the insurance to speculate against the fortunes of two troubled companies. That's because the value of their insurance, which increased as the Bear and Countrywide bonds fell, has now collapsed as those bonds have risen to reflect their takeover by stronger banks. We do not yet know who these speculators are, but hedge fund and proprietary trading desks on Wall Street are undoubtedly among them. ...
So consider all those swaggering hedge fund managers and Wall Street proprietary traders who recorded paper gains on their credit insurance bets as the prices of Bear and Countrywide bonds fell. Now they must reverse those gains as a result of the rescues. If they still hold the insurance contracts, they are up a creek -and the Fed just took away their paddles.
An interesting side note: It's likely that JPMorgan, the biggest bank in the credit default swap market, had a good deal of this kind of exposure to Bear Stearns on its books. Absorbing Bear Stearns for a mere $250 million allows JPMorgan to eliminate that risk at a bargain-basement price. JPMorgan declined to comment on the size of its portfolio of credit default swaps. ... speculators on the losing end of such deals don't typically volunteer that they have suffered enormous hits in their portfolios until they are forced to -often when they're on the brink of collapse. It's pretty clear that some major losses are floating around out there on busted credit default swap positions. Investors in hedge funds whose managers have boasted recently about their astute swap bets would be wise to ask whether those gains are on paper or in hand.
Hedge fund managers are paid on paper gains, after all, so the question is more than just rhetorical. ...". Reserve not only taken has action unprecedented since the Great Depression -by lending money directly to major investment banks -but also has put taxpayers on the hook for billions of dollars in questionable trades these same bankers made when the good times were rolling. ... things have gone too far ... The investment community has morphed into something beyond banks and something beyond regulation ... the shadow banking system ... the shadow banking system ... is the private trading of complex instruments ... In the past decade, there has been an explosion in complex derivative instruments, such as collateralized debt obligations and
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